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The obesity epidemic in the U.S. contributes to substantial economic, social, and personal 
losses (Mokdad et al., 1999; Wellman and Friedberg, 2002).  Its rapid and consistent 
growth is accompanied by a host of chronic diseases (e.g., asthma, atherosclerosis, 
depression, hyperinsulinaemia, hypertension, sleep apnea, and Type 2 diabetes) (Must et 
al., 1999). The resulting direct medical expenditures are 9% of U.S. annual medical 
expenditures (Finkelstein et al., 2003) and 27% of the rise in per capita health care 
expenditures between 1987 and 2001 (inflation adjusted) can be attributed to obesity 
(Thorpe et al., 2004). Obese adults on average spend 48% more inpatient days per year 
than normal-weight adults (Thompson et al., 2001), are more vulnerable to short-term 
disability (Arena et al., 2006), experience more absenteeism from work (Aldana and 
Pronk, 2001; Tsai et al., 2005), and exhibit decreased productivity (presenteeism) in the 
workplace (Burton et al., 2005; Ricci and Chee, 2005).  In the U.S., the aggregate annual 
costs attributable to obesity alone are estimated to be $73.1 billion (Finkelstein et al., 
2010).  
These undesirable health and economic consequences have motivated the federal 
government and employers to invest in weight control programs.  However, the 
participation rate (i.e., the reach of these programs) is consistently low (generally around 
10% to 15% eligible employees participated) which causes limited public health impacts 
(Zamosky, 2010).  Even when the program participation fees, food and exercise expenses 
are paid by a third party, weight control program participants still face substantial time 
and psychological costs (Kane et al., 2004a; Kane et al., 2004b).  A sizable personal time 
investment is needed to learn about and then implement successful weight loss strategies. 3 
 
Foods and activities that were once enjoyed (e.g., watching TV or eating fast food) must 
be limited or eliminated to achieve weight control goals.  Offering financial incentive is 
the most common way to encourage weight control program participation and adherence 
(see reviews such as Kane et al., 2004a; Kane et al., 2004b; Paul-Ebhohimhen and 
Avenell, 2008; Wall et al., 2006).  
Different aspects of incentives have been investigated in the preventive care literature 
such as the forms of incentives (e.g., insurance co-pay, coupon, gift or cash) (Cherkin et 
al., 1990; Kenkel, 1994; Lillard et al., 1986); the amount of monetary value of the 
incentives (Doody et al., 2003; Helpern et al., 2002); the certainty of the payment (Volpp 
et al., 2008); the contingency conditions (i.e., whether the payment is tied to participation 
or to outcomes) (Curry et al., 1991; Donatelle et al., 2000; Higgins et al., 2004); and the 
timing of the incentive payment (Finkelstein et al., 2007).  The consensus is that financial 
incentives are consistently positively related to initial program participation rates. 
However there is a dearth of research on answering how well financial incentives 
work in enhancing program reach since no systematic analysis has been undertaken to 
understand the interaction between the different aspects of incentives and people’s 
program participation decisions. A practice uniformly absent in previous studies of 
incentive-based programs is the rational justification of the incentive designs including 
the choices of incentive amount, type and timing. 
This study takes a key step to advance the literature on financial incentives in weight 
loss programs by formally evaluating the effects of the magnitude, type, and timing of 
financial incentives in stimulating participation in a weight loss program among 
overweight and obese adults.  4 
 
 
2. Related Literature 
Financial incentives have been one of the common tools used to encourage desirable 
behaviors and induce better decision-making. In the context of weight control programs, 
the examination of incentive effectiveness began as early as the 1970s (e.g., Jeffery 
(1978).  However, most studies were randomized control trials and therefore were limited 
in the ability of comparing a full range of incentive attributes and levels. Furthermore, 
most studies did not test the direct incentive effects independent of intensive weight 
control program structures.
1 Therefore the direct effect of financial incentives may be 
masked (i.e., the influence of financial incentives may be redundant rather than additive 
to, or interactive with, intensive programs) (Finkelstein et al., 2007; Kane et al., 2004a; 
Kane et al., 2004b; Paul-Ebhohimhen and Avenell, 2008). 
Finkelstein et al. (2007) conducted a pilot study to examine stand-alone financial 
incentives in the absence of a structured weight loss program. They found that financial 
incentives resulted in short-term weight loss (3 months), but long-term maintenance was 
not assessed. Similarly, Volpp et al. (2008) demonstrated the short-term effectiveness 
(over 4 months) of incentives used in conjunction with an initial dietitian-directed 
counseling session and frequent self-monitoring.  Both studies could only explore limited 
variations of incentive structures and results and inferences were bounded within the 
sample of program participants.  Both papers called for future research to assess financial 
incentive effects on program reach and long-term weight loss outcome maintenance.  
                                                 
1 Intensive programs are those programs that have frequent person contacts, program monitoring and group 
meetings etc. 5 
 
Economists have been working on modeling, testing and constructing effective 
incentive structures especially in the cases of smoking cessation, substance abuse control 
and education promotion (e.g., Dallery and Glenn, 2005; Gine et al., 2010; Kremer et al., 
2009).  In the context of weight loss programs, although economic intuition suggests the 
potential positive effect of financial incentives in motivating program participation and 
promoting better outcomes, limited economic research has addressed this topic.  There 
have been calls for more active role uptakes by economists in effective utilization of 
financial incentives to shape individuals’ health behaviors through rigorous economic 
analytic methods (Sindelar, 2008).  Recent experimental economic work has shown that 
paying students who did not exercise often to go to the gym regularly can reinforce the 
exercise habit which can then be maintained even after the incentives are withdrawn 
(Charness and Gneezy, 2009). Burger and Lynham (2010) examined data from the weight 
loss betting industry and found that gender heterogeneity needs to be considered in the 
design of weight loss incentive.  However to our knowledge there currently does not exit 
research which simultaneously examines the influence of different financial incentive 
attributes and multiple associated attribute levels on individuals’ weight loss program 
participation decisions. 
An important step towards making large impacts on public health through weight loss 
programs is to understand how different aspects of financial incentives can work together 
to help reach more people (through participation).  This study employs stated-preference 
methods to systematically investigate this question.  Our results provide much needed 
information for the appropriate design of incentives for different population subgroups to 
stimulate participation in weight loss programs.  Results will further inform full-scale 6 
 
randomized control trials through calibrating the incentive components which is the 
crucial step recommended by Stevens et al.(2007). 
 
3. Conceptual Framework and Model Specification 
An individual’s utility associated with a weight loss program is assumed to be comprised 
of systematic (observed) and random (unobserved) elements. The observed component is 
specified in terms of the program attributes. Specifically, individual i’s utility associated 
with weight loss program j is: 
Uij   Xjij, j 1,2,...,J     ( 1 )
2 
where Xj is a vector of the relevant incentive attributes for the program option j (e.g., 
magnitude, type and timing), β is a vector of associated preference parameters and εij is 
the random error term. If program j is chosen it is assumed that this program yields the 
maximum utility among available weight loss program options ( J j ).  In its current 
form equation (1) assumes that the utility a person receives from engaging in a weight 
loss program (X) is separable from the utility brought by other goods and services (Y).  
That is: 
U(X,Y)/XY 0     (2). 
This assumption may or may not be reasonable, but as empirical observers we do not 
know which elements of Y would affect (interact with) characteristics of a weight loss 
program (X).  To address this potential issue we consider two personal characteristics, sex 
and weight status (i.e., normal weight, overweight or obese), that might proxy for these 
other variables and influence people’s evaluation of weight-loss program characteristics. 
Thus, equation (1) is rewritten as: 
J j w s X U ij i i j ij ,..., 3 , 2 , 1 ,            (3) 
                                                 
2 The utility associated with not participating in the weight loss program is set to be zero. 7 
 
where s denotes subject sex, w is a vector of weight categories, and γ and ρ are effect 
parameters. 
Preferences for weight loss programs were elicited through choice questions where 
each question asked subjects to choose between two weight loss programs and a third 
option of not participating in any one of the programs.  The conceptual framework for 
analyzing responses to choice questions is based on the random utility model of utility 
differences (Hanemann, 1984; McFadden, 1974; Swait, 2006; Train, 2003).  The 
probability that program j is chosen is:  
J K k j ASC W s X ASC w s X j ik k k ij j j             , ], ) ( ' ) ( Pr[ ) Pr(          
)] ( ) )( ( ) ( Pr[ ik ij k j k j ASC ASC w s X X               
] ) )( ( ) ( Pr[ jk k j ASC w s X X                 ( 4 )  
Note, we have interacted sex (s) and (w) with an alternative specific constant (ASC) that 
indicates if a weight loss program is chosen (=1) or not (=0).  The interaction prevents the 
demographic characteristics from cancelling out in the utility difference.  This simple 
specification assumes that s and w affect the probability that a person will choose any 
weight loss program over no weight loss program. 
Assuming an extreme value distribution for the errors ( jk  ), the probability of 
choosing program option j is the standard conditional logit model (Greene, 2000).  
However, the conditional logit model contains restrictive assumptions that are 
questionable: a) choices made by an individual are not correlated over the S repeated 
choice scenarios even though subjects were each asked to answer four choice questions, 
and b) parameters are assumed to be fixed which implies that all individuals have 
identical preferences across the weight loss program characteristics.  A random-
parameters logit model) relaxes these assumptions by allowing some preference 
parameters (elements of β) to vary randomly over individuals (Revelt and Train, 1998; 8 
 
Train, 1998, 2003).  The preference parameters are drawn from a density  ) | (   f  with 
unknown parameters   (typically a mean and a variance). 
Conditional on the unknown individual-specific parameters, βi, the probability of 
individual i making a given sequence of choices over S choice scenarios is the product of 













        ( 5 )  
In our case, S equals 4 and J equals 3. By specifying a distribution for f(),   can be 
estimated using a simulated maximum likelihood procedure (Train, 2003). Here, we 
assume the parameters are distributed normally. 
This conceptual specification of the weight loss program allows two forms of 
heterogeneity to enter the analysis. First, the proclivity to participate in any weight loss 
program may be affected by subjects’ sex (s) and current weight categorization (w); 
Second, each subject is allowed to respond to the program characteristics (X) differently.  
Allowing for such heterogeneity has the potential to provide insights to the development 
of more effective recruitment protocols for weight loss programs. 
 
4. Study Design 
Choice questions (sometimes referred to as conjoint analysis, choice modeling or 
attribute-based choice questions) are a derivate of stated-preference methods, which are a 
family of survey-research methods used to systematically investigate preferences for 
programs (e.g., weight loss interventions) through program attributes (e.g., financial 
incentive).  The merit of stated-preference methods is their ability to use carefully 9 
 
constructed program scenarios to elicit preference information for new programs where 
revealed-preference data are not available.  Stated-preference techniques have been 
widely used in marketing, transportation and environmental economics (Hensher et al., 
2005; Holmes and Adamowicz, 2003; Louviere et al., 2000). In recent years stated-
preference methods, including choice questions, have been increasingly popular in the 
field of health economics. Studies have used stated-preference methods to model choice 
of health plans (Booske et al., 1995; Cunningham et al., 1999; Harris et al., 2002) and 
choice of medication (Bingham et al., 2001), to estimate patient preferences for different 
aspects of health care services (Chakraborty et al., 1994; Chakraborty et al., 1993; 
Moayyedi et al., 2002), to assess preferences in doctor-patient relationship (Vick and 
Scott, 1998) and to establish general practitioner preference for different practice jobs 
(Wordsworth et al., 2004).  
In practice, two types of choice questions have been employed, binary choices and 
multi-program choices. Binary-choice questions typically ask subjects if they will or will 
not participate in a program (Kjaer et al., 2006; Kvamme et al., 2010; Ryan et al., 2006). 
Multi-program questions typically ask subjects to choose between two or more 
alternative programs and an additional option of not participating (Brown et al., 2009; 
Ozdemir et al., 2009; Paterson et al., 2008).  The key similarity between all of these 
applications is that choice questions are used to elicit individuals’ preferences for 
different treatment and prevention programs by asking respondents to choose their 
preferred program that is defined by a set of treatment or outcome attributes. In fact, the 
Brown et al. (2009) study is similar to our study in that subjects would be paid an 
incentive to participate in a program to improve their health (a walking program for older 10 
 
adults) and subjects are asked to consider other attributes of the program that might 
induce participation.  The estimation results from choice-question data enable researchers 
to determine the relative importance of the different attributes in influencing statements 
of program-participation decisions. 
 
4.1. Survey Design − Program Description and Incentive Attributes 
Survey participants were asked to indicate their willingness to participate in a 3-month 
weight loss program. The program included an initial face-to-face consultation with a 
dietitian, personalized eating and exercising plans and tracking tools, and weekly 
telephone support calls, monthly program weigh-in visits (1
st, 2
nd, and 3
rd months), two 
follow-up weigh-in visits to monitor maintenance of weight loss after the active 3-month 
program is completed (6
th and 12
th months) (See appendix for details). We chose this 
minimal weight loss program as the platform for evaluation instead of the intensive ones 
in order to avoid potentially masking the effectiveness of financial incentives. Survey 
participants were informed that losing 5% of body weight for overweight and obese 
individuals would greatly reduce the risk of chronic diseases.  This condition was used as 
the basis for a monetary incentive: if program participants achieved and maintained at 
least 5% weight loss when compared to their initial weight at each weigh-in visit, they 
would receive a financial incentive. 
The program scenarios are defined in terms of different combinations of financial 
incentive attributes. These attributes (Table 1) include:  
a.  monetary value of the incentive ($),  11 
 
b.  form of incentive (cash, prepaid grocery card, pre-paid gym pass, and 
healthcare co-pay waiver), and 
c.  timing of incentive payment (at each weigh-in, at the end of the 3-month 
program, or at the end of the last follow-up at 12
th month).   
Each choice questions presented subjects with two weight loss programs to choose 
between which were differentiated by varying levels of at least one of the financial 
incentive attributes described above (Figure 1). Subjects were asked to indicate the 
program they would choose or to not choose either program.  Each subject was asked to 
answer four choice questions. The survey also included questions to collect information 
about the individuals’ socio-economic characteristics, physical activity level, healthy 
eating behavior, intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, weight and height, and general health 
status. 
Before the survey was implemented two focus groups were conducted with 
participants from the targeted population.  The focus group results were used to refine 
survey content with a specific focus on the description of the weight loss program and the 
framing of the choice questions. 
 
4.2. Attribute Design 
One might want to consider a design where subjects collectively have a chance to 
consider all binary pairings of attributes in the choice question, e.g., $5 in Program A and 
$24 in Program B, then $5 in Program A and $55 in Program B.  The same would follow 
for the payment type and payment timing attribute levels.  For our study, we have three 
attributes, resulting in 20 pairings for the monetary incentive amount, 12 pairings for 12 
 
payment type, and 6 pairings for payment timing. Trying to include all of these possible 
pairings in every combination would lead to a prohibitively large design (20×12×6).  We 
opted to use a simpler design that results in a slight amount of correlation among attribute 
differences, but it keeps the design a manageable size (12×6). All possible parings for 
payment type and timing are included and then one of the monetary incentive amounts is 
randomly assigned to each pairing. 
The pairings for each attribute are combined to form choice sets that become 
Programs A and B in the choice questions. To minimize attribute correlation, a 12 × 6 
fractional factorial matrix was used.  We developed the 72-line matrix using Kuhfeld’s 
on-line design catalog (SAS, 2009). We then assigned monetary incentive amounts 
randomly to each of the alternatives in each choice set. The final design of choice 
questions is comprised of 72 choice sets (Program A/B combinations).  The 72 program 
pairings were divided into 18 survey versions with four choice questions in each survey. 
These 18 survey versions were then randomly assigned to participants.  
 
4.3. Survey Implementation 
We administered a mail survey to 1,500 adults. Survey participants were recruited 
throughout the Commonwealth of Virginia via random digital dialing. The phone 
recruitment and survey mailing were conducted by the Virginia Tech Center for Survey 
Research.  
Survey participants were screened over the phone to ensure recruitment eligibility 
(i.e., at least 18 yrs old).  Individuals provided self-reported weight and height over the 
phone and research staffs used this information to calculate Body Mass Index (BMI) and 13 
 
screened them further: the recruitment goal is to have ~300 normal weight adults and 
~1,200 overweight or obese adults agree to participate in the survey over the phone.
3  A 
total of 1,500 surveys were mailed out in three rounds over the months of October and 
November 2009, and February 2010.
4  No follow-up calls or secondary mailings were 
used. We received 863 complete and usable surveys leading to a 60% completion rate.
5 
The surveys were then coded by trained research staff and the data were double-entered. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Data Description 
Table 2 reports summary statistics of survey respondents’ characteristics.  There were 
more women than men in our sample (67% vs. 33%). Over 80% of respondents are 
Caucasian and about 10% are African American. The average age is 55. A majority of the 
respondents have at least some college education.  Approximately half (48%) of female 
respondents were not working at the time of the survey either because they were retired, 
unemployed, students or unpaid home workers. This ratio is lowered to 40% in the male 
subsample.  Male respondents earn more than female respondents.  Nearly half of all 
male respondents (49%) were overweight and 35% were obese. In contrast, in the female 
subsample fewer are overweight and more are obese.   
 
                                                 
3 The normal weight survey participants were told to complete the survey as if they actually need a weight 
loss program.  
4 The final sample of 1,500 is comprised of 277 normal weight individuals, 577 overweight individuals and 
646 obese individuals. 
5 Out of the 1,500 mail-outs, we have about 60 non-deliverable addresses.  14 
 
5.2. Random Parameters Logit Estimates 
Similar to Paterson et al. (2008) we specify utility for individual i associated with 
program j in choice scenario s in additive form as: 
ijs j iT j iF j M i iA ijs T F M A U              (6) 
where Ai is a alternative-specific constant (ASC) indicating a program was chosen and 
equals 1 when either program was chosen (0 otherwise), M is the monetary amount of the 
incentive, F is vector of binary variables capturing the form of the incentive payment and 
T is a vector of binary variables capturing the timing of the incentive payment.  The 
omitted category from F is the insurance co-pay waiver and for T it is the payment at 12 
months.  Each of the F and T variables’ coefficients are allowed to be normally 
distributed when estimating the random parameters logit model and the marginal utility 
of money (βM) is assumed to be constant across subjects.  This is the same analytical 
framework used by Özdemir (2009) and Paterson (2008).  The Özdemir study did not 
include a monetary incentive.  The Paterson study did include a monetary incentive, but 
similar to what is done here, they allowed each of the monetary attribute variables 
preference parameters to be randomly distrubted except the monetary amount variable. 
We report two models in Table 3. Model 1 estimates equation (6) including only the 
ASC and attributes of the financial incentive.  Model 2 appends interactions between the 
ASC and subjects’ sex and current weight status. Both models indicate that individuals 
are more likely to participate if they receive a higher monetary incentive, and the 
coefficient on this variable is robust to the inclusion/exclusion of the sex and weight 
status interaction effects. Cash and grocery card payments are preferred to default 
payment type, which is the insurance co-pay waiver, and a gym pass payment’s effect on 15 
 
the probability of participating in a given program is not significantly different from the 
insurance co-pay waiver.  The effect of both cash and grocery card are about 10 times 
larger than that of a gym pass.  Thus, individuals respond favorably to financial 
incentives, provided the interface (form of payment) is appropriate.  A test that the 
parameter estimates for the cash and grocery card forms of payment are statistically equal 
cannot be reject in either model (p= 0.8836 and p= 0.9851, respectively).  
The standard deviation estimates generated by the random parameter logit models 
enable us to investigate heterogeneity or differences in preferences for attributes. The 
estimated standard deviations are significant for all three payment forms which suggests 
there is heterogeneity in subjects’ preferences for payment forms.  Given the normal 
distribution assumption imposed, the estimated mean (1.214) and standard deviation 
(0.798) associated with the cash coefficient in Model 1 indicates that a small percentage 
of respondents, about 6%, prefer a co-pay waiver to cash payment, i.e., the coefficient on 
the cash variable is negative (this is intuitive if we consider that some potential 
participants visit the doctor more than others).  For the grocery card option, about 13% of 
subjects prefer a co-pay waiver to the grocery card.  These percentages increases to 31% 
and 34%, respectively, when gender and weight status variables are added to the equation 
(Model 2).  It is interesting to note the mean parameter estimates for the cash and grocery 
card variables are stable when sex and weight status are added to the model, but their 
standard deviations increase.  This increased variation could result from an over-
specification of our model of random utility given that we have relatively few 
observations in each cell (male/female, normal/overweight/obese). However, our key 
results pertaining to program participation are nearly identical across the two models. 16 
 
The payment timing variables are significant in both models, indicating that monthly 
payments (payment at each weigh-in) and one cumulative payment at 12 months (the 
base) are preferred to a single payment at the end of the 3-month active portion of the 
weight-loss program.  The single payment at the end of the 3-month program only 
rewards the result of one weigh-in and no additional incentives are associated with the 
other two follow-up weigh-ins while the other two timing options (pay at each weigh-in 
and pay at 12-month) attach incentives to all three weigh-ins.  Thus, results indicate that 
individuals would prefer to be paid more often in the program which may reflect the 
desire to be recognized during the process. Unlike the form of payment parameters, both 
the means and standard deviations of the timing variables are affected by the inclusion of 
sex and weight status in the equation; the mean for the 3-month payment becomes larger, 
the mean for payment at each weigh-in becomes smaller, and the standard deviations of 
both increase and become significant.   
All interaction terms in model 2 are statistically significant which shows considerable 
sex and BMI status heterogeneity in participation preference. The inclusion of two-way 
and three-way interactions enables the comparison between sex and weight status groups 
(a total of 6 groups). Table 4 presents the magnitudes and p-values for the participation 
preference differences among these groups.  It shows clearly that participation preference 
is statistically significantly different when comparing females from any weight status to 
normal weight males.  In general, a female, regardless of her weight, is statistically more 
likely to participate in the weight loss program than normal weight male. Furthermore, 
obese males are more likely to participate compared to overweight male.  No further 17 
 
significant preference heterogeneity is found through interaction models after controlling 
for the program incentive attributes. 
To further investigate the relationship among the financial incentive attributes, we 
calculate how much is needed to offset the “cost” of participating in the weight loss 
program (the minimal dollar amount threshold) under different incentive frameworks. 
This cost of participation is determined for each attribute, holding the remaining 
attributes constant (i.e., type and timing), by calculating the necessary amount of the 
incentive per weigh-in that gives the same utility level as though the person elected not to 
participate.  Table 5 presents the minimum payments per weigh-in calculated using 
results from the model with sex and weight status interactions.  Given the fact that our 
models have random parameters, we set the preference coefficients at their estimated 
means so our participation costs can be interpreted as average participation costs. In order 
to provide enough motivation to an overweight male, the weight loss program needs to 
offer more than $59.46 per weigh-in in cash if the payment is at the end of the 3-month 
program.  The per weigh-in amount decreases to $10.23 if the payment happens at each 
weigh-in.  Furthermore, the amount needs to increase to $116.00 if it is in the form of a 
gym pass instead.  For an overweight female, a similar trend exists: the program needs to 
offer more than $60.31 per weigh-in in gym pass if the payment happens at each weigh-in 
to attract her.  This amount decreases to $3.77 if it is in cash and increases to $109.54 if it 
is paid at the end of the 3-month program. 
Our results show differences in coefficient estimates across sex. However, these 
estimated coefficient differences may occur as the result of scale differences in the 
random component of the utility (i.e., variance differences).  Therefore, we adopt the 18 
 
procedure of Swait and Louviere (1993), to test whether the observed differences in our 
coefficient estimates are due to actually heterogeneity across sex or simply differences in 
scale between the two groups.  Specifically, we tested whether the parameter estimates 
are equal after accounting for differences in scale factors across gender groups. The 
likelihood ratio test gives us a statistics of 127.03 with a p-value of 0.000.  Therefore, we 
reject the null hypothesis and confirm that preference heterogeneity exists beyond 
differences in scale across sex and our minimal weight-loss program will be more 
effective in reach if the program can customize the incentive component by gender. 
 
5.3. The Incentivized Minimal Weight-Loss Program Reach Prediction 
Table 6 presented average predicted probabilities of participation in the weight loss 
program for each attribute combination, conditioned on sex and weight status. The results 
are calculated based on the estimation of Model 2.  To help the reader sift through the 
array of predictions, we bolded the attribute combinations where the estimated model 
predicts that more than 50% of the subjects will participate.  
Several interesting insights can be gained from Table 6. Comparing the upper part of 
the table with the lower part, the preference heterogeneity that exists across sex can be 
readily seen.  Normal weight men are unlikely to participate but normal weight women 
are likely to participate.  Overweight men are somewhat less likely to participate than 
overweight women and the opposite relationship holds for obese men and women.  These 
differences are relatively small in practical terms, generally less than 5% for overweight 
people and generally less than 10% for obese people. Normal weight or overweight 
females in general can accept any payment timing of any form at a lower dollar amount 19 
 
compared to normal weight or overweight males. This trend is reversed when the 
comparison is made between obese females and obese males.  Figure 2 provides a visual 
example to show the extant gender heterogeneity: fixing the payment form in cash and 
timing at each weigh-in, the predicted participation rate exhibits a wide range for males 
of different weight status (i.e., the participation prediction curves exhibit a wide spread), 
while the predicted participation rate are pretty similar for females of different weight 
status (i.e., the participation prediction curves are clustered together). 
Examining preference heterogeneity within gender but across weight status (i.e., 
comparing rows within either the upper or lower part of Table 6), we can see that males 
generally show more interest in the program as their weight status elevates. However, this 
trend is not clear when we look at females. Furthermore, normal weight females even 
exhibit a higher preference towards program participation compared to overweight and 
obese females. Figure 3 provides a visual example of this within gender preference 
heterogeneity towards payment forms.  The two predicted participation curves when the 
incentives are in the form of cash and gift card essentially overlapped. The copay waiver 
is preferred to gym pass when the amount is greater or equal to $24.00. 
Overall, the predicted participation rates for a payment at the end of 12 months are 
about 10% lower than the pay at each weigh-in scheme. A payment at each weigh-in with 
cash or grocery card obtains the highest participation at the lowest cost: over 50% of 
overweight men will participate at a $24 incentive; over 50% of overweight women will 
participate at a $5 incentive; and over 50% of obese men and women will participate at a 
$5 incentive. Furthermore, at this preferred payment timing, an incentive of $98 results in 
a predicted participation rate of over 90% among overweight or obese men and women.  20 
 
Finally, there is no difference in the predicted probabilities for the cash and grocery card 
forms of payment. 
These results collectively suggest that weight loss programs with immediate incentive 
payments (i.e., pay at each weigh-in) are likely to enlist higher participation than 
programs with deferred payments.  Payment forms that give people more usage flexibility 
in their daily lives (i.e., cash or grocery card) are also likely to enlist higher participation. 
 
6. Discussion 
Participation rates (i.e., reach) of weight loss programs have been relatively low, limiting 
the potential for public health impacts.  Financial incentives are common tools employed 
in weight loss programs to increase program reach and adherence.  However no known 
study has simultaneously examined wide ranges of incentive attributes and levels in terms 
of their influence on weight loss program participation.  Our study employed stated-
preference methods to elicit individuals’ program participation preference towards 
different financial incentive attributes. 
The results of this study show promise for the use of carefully designed incentive 
programs enlisting greater participation in weight loss programs.  The observed 
heterogeneity, both in subject responses to program attributes and in terms of subject 
characteristics, indicates that a weight loss program with a one-size-fits-all financial 
incentive component will not maximize participation.  For example, while most subjects 
preferred the idea of a cash payment or a grocery card payment, small percentages of our 
subjects did not prefer these methods of payment.   21 
 
It might be surprising at first view that cash and grocery cards are preferred forms of 
payment relative to gym passes and insurance co-pay waivers.  Physical activity is a key 
to any successful weight loss program.  Overweight and obese people generally require 
more health care than normal weight people.  The main cause rests in the liquidity of the 
payment.  A gym pass is a single use payment form that has a pre-determined usage 
while cash has full usage flexibility and a grocery card frees up individuals’ cash that is 
normally allocated to grocery spending for other uses.  Thus, a fungible payment form is 
important for the incentive to be effective in reach.  In addition, some people may already 
have gym memberships or may not have insurance co-pays.  Future studies should look at 
subject characteristics and why they do not choose these incentive attributes more 
closely.  
Overall our results indicate that immediate payments that are easily fungible in 
peoples’ daily lives will engender the highest participation rates.  These results can be 
used to develop an understanding of what financial incentives attributes will be most 
successful in ensuring high participation (reach) of weight-loss programs, but one should 
interpret the absolute magnitudes of the predictions with caution.  These predictions are 
based on subjects’ statements of willingness to participate and the results say nothing 
about whether subjects will actually complete a weight loss program and maintain their 
weight loss.  These concerns can be addressed through a full-scale clinical trial where the 
results of this study provide a basis for designing and calibrating the specific financial 
incentive components in the trial. 
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Table 1. Attribute Levels 
 
Attribute Level  Value 
Monetary value  1  $5  
 2  $24   
 3  $55   
 4  $72   
 5  $98   
    
Form of incentive  1  Cash 
 2  Grocery  cards 
 3  Gym  pass 
   4  Co-pay waiver for doctor visits 
    
Timing of  payment  1  Pay at the last follow-up weigh-in (12-month) 
  2  Pay at the end of active program weigh-in (3-
month) 
   3  Pay at each weigh-in 29 
 
 












Race      
   Caucasian  87  83  84 
   African American  7  13  11 
   other  6  4  5 
      
Age (in years)      
   18-29  4  5  5 
   30-39  4  11  9 
   40-49  19  20  20 
   50-59  31  25  27 
   > 60  42  38  39 
      
Education      
   high school and less  27  28  28 
   some college  24  32  29 
   college graduate  25  22  23 
   postgrad degree  24  18  20 
      
Employment status      
full-time employed  55  39  44 
part-time employed  5  13  10 
unemployed 5  4  5 
retired 32  23  26 
student 1  1  1 
unpaid homemaker  0  15  10 
on disability  2  5  4 
      
Income      
   30k or less  15  22  20 
   30k-75k  30  42  38 
   75k-120k  32  22  25 
   120k or more  22  14  17 
      
BMI      
   normal  16  25  22 
   overweight  49  35  39 




Table 3. Random Parameter Logit Model Results 
   (1)    (2) 
 mean  sd    mean  sd 
ASC -0.089  4.816***    -3.339***   
 (0.280)  (0.313)    (0.351)   
Monetary value  0.022***      0.026***   
 (0.002)      (0.002)   
 
Pay form (Base: Copay waiver) 
 Cash  1.214***  0.798***    1.246***  2.586*** 
 (0.113)  (0.253)    (0.150)  (0.243) 
 Grocery card  1.230***  1.075***    1.242***  2.974*** 
 (0.116)  (0.224)    (0.168)  (0.260) 
 Gym pass  -0.116  1.912***    -0.224  2.876*** 
 (0.138)  (0.225)    (0.176)  (0.278) 
 
Timing of payment (Base: payment at 12 month) 
 Payment at 3-months  -0.462*** 0.576***    -0.789***  2.005*** 
 (0.095)  (0.203)    (0.148)  (0.213) 
 Payment at each weigh-in  0.649***  0.191    0.491***  1.721*** 
 (0.092)  (0.344)    (0.124)  (0.167) 
          
Gender Interaction          
ASC × female        1.697***   
       (0.356)   
BMI interaction (Base: Normal individuals) 
ASC × overweight        1.336***   
       (0.358)   
ASC × obese        1.892***   
       (0.371)   
ASC × overweight × female        -1.529***   
       (0.421)   
ASC × obese × female        -2.024***   
       (0.430)   
          
Log likelihood  -2,562      -2,984   
Observations  9,726        9,726   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1. 
** p < 0.05. 




Table 4. Participation Preference Heterogeneity across Age and Weight Status 
 
      Normal Weight  Overweight  Obese  
    Male  Female Male  Female Male  Female 
Normal Weight  Male      1.70*** 1.34*** 1.50*** 1.89*** 1.57*** 
       (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Female        -0.36  -0.19  0.20  -0.13 
          (0.130) (0.367) (0.443) (0.534) 
Overweight Male           0.17  0.56**  0.23 
            (0.450)  (0.034)  (0.294) 
 Female              0.39  0.06 
               (0.106)  (0.746) 
Obese Male                 -0.33 
                  (0.169) 
 Female                   
                    
Note: The upper triangular of this table presents the differences between column group 
and the row group. For example, the first cell in the first row value of 0.745 is the 
differences in participation probability between normal weight female and normal weight 
male.  p-values are in the parenthesis. 
* p < 0.1. 
** p < 0.05. 
*** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5. The Minimum Payment Dollar Amounts per Weigh-in 
  Timing of payment 
12-month 3-month  Each  weigh-in 
Normal male 
cash $80.50  $110.85  $61.62 
gift-card   $80.65  $111.00  $61.77 
copay waiver  $128.42  $158.77  $109.54 
gym-pass $137.04  $167.38  $118.15 
 
Overweight male 
cash $29.12  $59.46  $10.23 
gift-card $29.27  $59.62  $10.38 
copay waiver  $77.04  $107.38  $58.15 
gym-pass $85.65  $116.00  $66.77 
 
Obese male 
cash $7.73  $38.08  $0.00 
gift-card $7.88  $38.23  $0.00 
copay waiver  $55.65  $86.00  $36.77 
gym-pass $64.27  $94.62  $45.38 
 
Normal female 
cash $15.23  $45.58  $0.00 
gift-card $15.38  $45.73  $0.00 
copay waiver  $63.15  $93.50  $44.27 
gym-pass $71.77  $102.12  $52.88 
 
Overweight female 
cash $22.65  $53.00  $3.77 
gift-card $22.81  $53.15  $3.92 
copay waiver  $70.58  $100.92  $51.69 
gym-pass $79.19  $109.54  $60.31 
 
Obese female 
cash $20.31  $50.65  $1.42 
gift-card $20.46  $50.81  $1.58 
copay waiver  $68.23  $98.58  $49.35 
gym-pass $76.85  $107.19  $57.96 33 
 
Table 6. Average Predicted Weight-Loss Program Participation (Reach) by Attribute Combinations (% Participation) 
   Pay at 12-months   Pay at 3-months    Pay at each weigh-in 
  Incentive 























                          
Male 
                          
Normal 
Weight  
$5  12 12  3  4    6 6  0  2    19 19  5  0 
$24  19 19  5  6    9 9  2  3    27 27  8  10 
$55  34 34 11 13    19 19  5  6    46 45  16  19 
$72  44 44 15 19    27 26  8  9    57 56  23 27 
$98  61 61 26 31    41 41  14  17    72 72  37 42 
                          
Over-
weight  
$5  35 35 11 13    20 19  0  7    47 46  17  0 
$24  47 47 17 20    28 28  8  10    59 59  25 29 
$55  66 66 31 36    47 47  17  20    76 76  42 48 
$72  75 75 41 47    58 58  24 28    83 83  53  59 
$98  86 86 58 63    73 73  38 44    91 91  69  74 
                          
Obese    $5  48 48 18 21    30 30  0  11    60 60  26 0 
$24  60 60 26 30    41 41  14  17    71 71  36 42 
$55  77 77 44 49    61 61  26 31    85 85  56  62 
$72  84 84 55 60    71 71  36 41    90 90  66  71 
$98  91 91 70 75    82 82  52  58    94 94  80  83 
   
     
 
      
 
      34 
 
Female 
                           
Normal 
Weight  
$5  43 43 15 18    26 26  0  9    56 55  22 0 
$24  56 56 22 26    36 36  12  14    67 67  32 37 
$55  74 74 39 45    56 56  23 27    82 82  51  57 
$72  81 81 50  56    66 66  31 36    88 88  62  67 
$98  89 89 66 71    79 79  47  53    93 93  76  80 
                          
Over-
weight  
$5  39 39 13 15    22 22  0  8    51 51  19 0 
$24  51 51 19 23    32 32  10  12    63 63  28 33 
$55  70 70 35 40    51 51  19 23    79 79  46  52 
$72  78 78 45  51    62 62  27 32    85 85  57  63 
$98  88 87 62 67    76 76  42 48    92 92  73  77 
                          
Obese        
 
$5  40 40 13 16    23 23  0  8    52 52  20 0 
$24  52 52 20 24    33 33  10  13    64 64  29 34 
$55  71 71 36 41    53 53  20 24    80 80  48  54 
$72  79 79 47  52    63 63  28 33    86 86  59  64 
$98  88 88 63 68    77 77  44 49    92 92  74  78 
Note: This prediction table is calculated based on the random parameter logit model results. All values are in percentage. 
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Figure 3. Example of Preference Heterogeneity towards Incentive Payment Form 
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